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Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility is a much expected book, in 
which Dana Nelkin puts forward a new and rich account of freedom 
and moral responsibility. In the wake of Susan Wolf’s account, the 
Rational Abilities view — as Nelkin calls her account — claims that 
“one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability 
to recognize and act for good reasons” (3); a central “striking fea-
ture” of this view is that the ability to do otherwise is only needed for 
actions that are not done for good reasons or are not good, but not for 
good actions done for good reasons. The idea is that when someone 
acts for good reasons, she is thereby exercising the ability and it is not 
required that she be able to act badly or for bad reasons; but when 
one acts for bad reasons, one needs to be able to act for good reasons 
in order to be morally responsible.
The book has two parts. Nelkin’s agenda for the first half is to 
present a convincing account of abilities as well as to argue for the 
asymmetry between good and bad actions. The second part is an ac-
count of “our sense of ourselves as free and responsible”, in which a 
compatibilist understanding of alternatives is offered. Let us see, in 
order, how well she does on each of these tasks.
Nelkin begins by addressing the claim that alternative possibili-
ties are needed both for blameworthy and praiseworthy actions. In 
Chapter 2, she considers the argument from fairness for that view 
and argues that the parallel between i) the unfairness of blaming 
someone for a bad action, or an action done by bad reasons, which 
one was unable to avoid, and ii) the unfairness of praising someone 
for a good action that one was unable to avoid, is only apparent, since 
an opportunity to avoid doing something wrong and blameworthy, 
thus avoiding harm, seems only fair if we are going to impose such 
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harm; but it is notable that we don’t speak of the unfairness of lacking 
an opportunity to avoid acting well and so missing out on a benefit. 
(33)
However, the seeming plausibility of this response may be just due to 
a confusion between (Watson’s) two senses of responsibility, i.e. re-
sponsibility as ‘attributability’ (aretaic or characteriological responsi-
bility) or as ‘accountability’. The latter, which is the sense that more 
clearly requires avoidability, would be the true sense of responsibil-
ity (the ‘desert’ sense) at issue in the moral responsibility debate. But 
even if this is so, it still seems that there is room for an asymmetry 
here, insofar as the avoidability requirement is based on the openness 
to sanctions that blameworthiness appears to entail, but it is not easy 
to envisage an obvious counterpart for praise (36). It must be a dif-
ferent argument that which is here at work. Indeed, Nelkin contrasts 
this common rendering of the fairness argument with an interper-
sonal version of it, according to which an agent could complain that 
someone else is being praised for an unavoidable action of hers, when 
he himself failed to act well just because he could not help it — at 
first sight, it seems that this agent could rightly feel that he has been 
unfairly treated. Yet Nelkin argues that this argument involves an 
equivocation, since it hinges on a different notion of fairness: it invokes 
a distributive notion of fairness. She claims that “there is no contradic-
tion in attributing accountability while acknowledging unfairness in 
its distribution”, since the interpersonal complaint of unfairness “also 
applies to accounts of accountability that do require avoidability” (39, 
her italics), given that capacities are anyway unequally distributed.
However, I cannot see why this last reasoning does not apply to 
blameworthy actions as well. Once we accept that capacities (and 
opportunities) are unequally distributed and that this distribution is 
a matter of luck, but this does not affect — invalidate — praisewor-
thiness, why does this not apply to blameworthiness too? It seems 
likely that an interpersonal version of the unfairness argument con-
cerning blameworthy actions would call for the same verdict. It is 
equally serious to mark a student’s paper with an A when this A is 
undeserved than with an F when this F is also undeserved. One case 
is not less unfair than the other, regardless of whether the mark is 
a good or a bad one. And this seems to be independent of whether 
there are other students in the class. It applies equally if this student 
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were the only one, and even if no other past and future students were 
or would ever be registered in that course. Maybe the thing is that 
interpersonal comparison is always implicitly at work in responsibil-
ity judgments (even when there is no other actual person), but then 
the very distinction between the two (intra- and interpersonal) ver-
sions of the fairness argument becomes largely otiose.
It must be said that, demonstrating intellectual honesty, Nelkin 
calls also into question the very (intrapersonal) fairness argument 
concerning blameworthy action — which actually supports her 
asymmetrical view — on the basis of a distinction between blame-
worthiness and sanction: whether an action ought to be sanctioned 
is a further question, beyond its blameworthiness, what seems quite 
right.
The defense of the blame/praise asymmetry is completed in 
Chapter 5, when Nelkin turns to the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. 
This principle states that if an agent ought to perform an action, then 
she can perform it. More specifically,
(OIC) (i) If S ought to perform an action a, then S could have per-
formed action a, and (ii) if S ought not to have performed action 
a, then S could have refrained from performing action a.
If we focus on blameworthy actions,
If S is blameworthy for having performed action a, then S ought 
not to have performed action a.
And from this and OIC,
If S ought not to have performed an action a, then S could have 
refrained from performing action a.
Which yields
PAP-Blame. A person is morally blameworthy for what he has 
done only if he could have done otherwise.
Nelkin first explores its grounds and then considers and replies to 
the most important challenges to it. Her conclusion is that the prin-
ciple stands criticism, but, again, there is no satisfactory counterpart 
of it for praiseworthy actions. “There could be another rationale or 
principle, but not the natural and plausible rationale that supports 
alternatives for blame, but not for praise (or neutral cases).” (101) 
Together with results from Chapter 2, this explains why alternatives 
are needed for blameworthy actions, but not for praiseworthy ac-
tions. Although her reasoning is largely compelling, again my worry 
about the resulting asymmetry is a general one. I will put it now as 
a dilemma: either this view takes praise in a less serious way than 
blame, maybe as desert-independent (on the basis of its supposed 
harmless character); or once you accept that praise depends on many 
things beyond the agent’s strict control, why not accepting this for 
blame as well? Why is it fair for praise but not for blame? On the oth-
er hand, it seems to me that the ordinary asymmetry between praise 
and blame — which is surely a fact of our responsibility practices 
— is however due to real-life epistemic and pragmatic constraints, 
and often to good manners too, which do not grant transcending this 
pragmatic level. The very distinction between blameworthiness and 
overt blame and sanction (and praiseworthiness and overt praise and 
reward) blocks the asymmetry’s depth.
As advanced, another of the central aims of Nelkin’s Rational 
Abilities View is, certainly, to put forward a satisfactory account 
of rational abilities (Chapters 1, 3 and 4). Here she starts off with 
the idea of a reason-responsive mechanism, à la Fischer. Moral re-
sponsibility requires a capacity to act differently under different cir-
cumstances, and a general capacity to act differently given the actual 
reasons for acting. This general capacity consists of “a set of rational 
abilities that allow [the agent] to recognize and act on good reasons, 
where these includes moral reasons” (27). But her account goes be-
yond this. What is required is not only this “general capacity to do 
otherwise in certain cases, but [one] also needs not to be interfered 
with in such a way that [one] cannot exercise it on a particular occa-
sion.” (71) On the other hand, emotional capacities are not excluded 
from playing an important role in our responsibility-related agency 
— they might well be necessary for human agency — but this ac-
count provides conditions for moral responsibility that are independ-
ent from people’s reactions (see Chapter 1). Nelkin’s is certainly a 
non-Strawsonian account: moral responsibility does not depend on 
possessing reactive attitudes. It is the appropriateness of holding one 
responsible (having reactive attitudes) what hinges on one’s being 
responsible, and not the other way around.
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Importantly, the mentioned capacity to do otherwise does not 
involve having undetermined alternatives — it must be clear that 
Nelkin’s is a compatibilist view — but only “having alternatives for 
which our deliberation makes a difference.” (71) And, indeed, this is 
further developed in the second part of the book. But before going 
to this, it is worth noticing her surprising and challenging defense of 
a compatibilist account of agent causation, which according to her 
does better than its libertarian version at ensuring enhanced control. 
Her version denies both that agent causation must be undetermined 
— of course — and that “it is fundamentally different in kind from 
causation that does not invoke agents” (81; see Chapter 4). As an 
aside: it seems to me that inasmuch as this notion is deprived from 
these crucial features it loses most part of its appeal, but this could be 
a good move in order to neutralize a potential competitor.
Up to this point, the first part of the book. The second half 
(Chapter 6 and 7) deals with the sense of freedom, famously invoked by 
Kant and Thomas Reid. What are exactly our commitments when 
we deliberate to act? Nelkin argues that our experience as free agents 
who deliberate about what to do only commits us to the belief that 
our deliberation contributes to how we act, but not to indetermin-
ism, i.e. to having undetermined alternatives. The author engages 
here in an important ongoing debate about the nature of the alterna-
tives: metaphysical, epistemic, conditional, etc. — and argues for a 
novel and plausible view: the Explanatory Nexus Thesis.
(EN) Rational deliberators must believe, in virtue of their nature as 
rational deliberators, that they have multiple alternatives from which 
to choose, where their deliberation is the explanatory nexus among al-
ternatives. (142)
Our deliberation is, according to this view, the difference-maker 
among the considered alternatives — plausibly, it should actually 
make this difference, not only that we believe it does, although not 
the kind of difference that requires indeterminism as advocated by 
incompatibilists. In the final chapter, she adds that what our sense of 
freedom really commits us to is “to the idea that our actions are up 
to us in such a way that we are responsible for them”, which explains 
why we choose and act as we do (169). This understanding of such 
a central feature of our self-understanding allows the compatibilist 
to integrate a strong motivation for libertarianism, keeping its anti-
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skeptical force. Irrespectively of its final merits, this proposal is a 
great contribution to the important debate about the nature of alter-
natives, worthy of close consideration.
Indeed, most chapters of this book make interesting contribu-
tions to particular topics within the debate about free will and moral 
responsibility and beyond, worth considering by themselves, regard-
less of the book’s overall argument. I must mention such issues as the 
fairness of the reactive attitudes, the fairness of inflicting harm and 
punishment, forgiveness, the responsibility of psychopaths, source 
and leeway arguments for PAP, or Frankfurt scenarios, just to cite 
some topics brilliantly addressed by Nelkin which cannot be dis-
cussed here. On the other hand, it is true — as the author claims 
— that the Rational Abilities View is “flexible”, since it is consistent 
with different implementations of the idea that rational agents are the 
causes of their actions, different conceptions of the role of emotions in 
rational agency, and different views of the connection among blame, 
the reactive attitudes and punishment. And it is also part of this ec-
umenical tendency, the effort made at incorporating some central 
incompatibilist intuitions. However, it has its nonnegotiable commit-
ments: compatibilism, asymmetry about the ability to do otherwise, 
a central role for obligations and reasons for acting, and a particular 
account of the commitments that we manifest as rational delibera-
tors. Of course one can still bring them apart, sharing some of them 
and rejecting others. But, as a whole, this is a novel and judicious ac-
count of freedom and moral responsibility that challenges both cur-
rent compatibilist and incompatibilist views, which everybody in the 
debate needs to take very seriously.
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